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ABSTRACT
Rejected Syrians: Violations of the Principle of “Non-Refoulement” in Turkey, 
Jordan and Lebanon
The article analyses the practices used by Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon to prevent Syrians 
from exercising their right to seek and enjoy asylum. The article consists of two sections. 
The first section examines how all three host countries violated the principle of non-re-
foulement by employing a range of unlawful practices (e.g. border closures and “push-
backs”, arbitrary detentions and deportations etc.). The second section examines how 
Lebanon resorted to practices that created circumstances for constructive refoulement 
of Syrian asylum seekers and refugees (e.g. shutting down the authority responsible for 
processing asylum claims, stripping Syrian refugees of their protected status etc.). 
KEY WORDS: Syrian refugees, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, principle of non-refoulement, 
constructive refoulement
IZVLEČEK
Zavrnjeni Sirci: Kršitve načela nevračanja v Turčiji, Libanonu in Jordaniji
Članek analizira prakse, ki so jih Turčija, Jordanija in Libanon uporabili z namenom, da 
sirskim državljanom preprečijo uveljavljanje pravice do iskanja in uživanja pribežališča 
pred preganjanjem. Članek je sestavljen iz dveh delov. Prvi del analizira, kako so vse tri 
države gostiteljice z uporabo nezakonitih praks kršile načelo nevračanja (npr. zapiranje 
meja in preprečevanje prehoda, samovoljno zapiranje in deportiranje itd.). Drugi del 
članka analizira, kako je Libanon uporabil prakse, ki so ustvarile pogoje za posredno 
prisilno vračanje sirskih iskalcev azila in beguncev (npr. zaprtje edine institucije, pristoj-
ne za obravnavanje prošenj za azil, odvzem statusa nekaterim sirskim beguncem itd.).
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INTRODUCTION
Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the vast majority of Syrian refugees have 
found shelter in Syria’s neighbouring countries – Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (UNHCR 
2017a). The three host countries adopted two approaches to address the challenges 
represented by the massive number of Syrians seeking safe refuge. The first approach, 
used in the first two years of the conflict, was to maintain an open door policy for 
Syrian asylum seekers and grant them limited protected status and access to the most 
basic services (Akram et al. 2014; AI 2014a; NRC 2014). The second approach, gradual-
ly implemented when the number of Syrians seeking shelter reached unsustainable 
levels, shifted to a closed door policy. In October 2014, for example, the Lebanese au-
thorities approved a new policy on Syrian refugees with the objective of reducing the 
number of Syrians in Lebanon by limiting cross-border movements from Syria and by 
“encouraging” Syrian refugees in Lebanon to return to their homeland (Janmyr 2016: 
61–62). Although Turkey and Jordan did not announce the end of their open door 
policy, it was evident, based on the measures they adopted to prevent Syrians from 
crossing the borders, that both countries took a similar path as Lebanon.1
While it is true that all three host countries should be commended for providing 
aid to such a large number of Syrian refugees, it is also important to examine how 
these countries tried to control the influx of Syrians by relying on practices in direct 
contravention of international law. This article focuses on the implementation of the 
closed door policy in order to examine how Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon tried to 
stop, or at least limit, the continuing mass influx of Syrian asylum seekers. The central 
part of the article consists of two sections. The first section examines how all three 
host countries systemically violated the principle of non-refoulement by employing a 
range of unlawful practices that aimed at stopping Syrian asylum seekers in their at-
tempts to cross the borders and gain access to the authorities responsible for making 
protection status determinations. Those unlawful practices included border closures 
and push-backs of Syrian asylum seekers trying to cross the borders, the introduc-
tion of discriminatory criteria for determining which groups of Syrian asylum seekers 
were not allowed to cross the borders, as well as arbitrary detentions and deporta-
tions of Syrian asylum seekers. The second section of the article examines how one 
of the host countries – Lebanon – resorted to practices that created circumstances 
for constructive refoulement of Syrian asylum seekers and refugees. Those practices 
included shutting down the sole authority responsible for processing asylum claims, 
de-registering Syrians with protected status, and preventing Syrian refugees from 
obtaining/retaining residency permits.
1 The European Union (EU) made a similar, albeit much more rapid, shift from an open door to 
a closed door policy. In late 2015, the so-called humanitarian corridor temporarily allowed 
large numbers of refugees, including Syrian refugees, to reach the EU through the Western 
Balkans (Kogovšek Šalamon 2017). In early 2016, however, the corridor was closed and the EU 
returned to its closed door policy (Oxfam 2017).
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VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF “NON-REFOULEMENT”
The principle of non-refoulement prohibits the return, in any manner whatsoever, of 
individuals to another territory, or to the frontiers of another territory, where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that they would be subjected to torture or de-
grading treatment, or where they would be subjected to other serious deprivations 
of human rights (UN General Assembly 1951; Feller 2006: 523). Considered part of 
international customary law and recognized, as some authors argued, as a jus co-
gens norm, the norm prohibiting refoulement binds all states, regardless of whether 
or not they are a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, to refrain from expelling 
people to territories where their lives and freedoms may be threatened (Allain 2001: 
538–542; Farmer 2008: 23–28). Although Jordan and Lebanon are not signatories to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, while Turkey maintains a “geographical limitation” to 
the Convention in order to avoid applying it to non-European refugees (Akram et 
al. 2014: 34, 59, 101), all three countries are bound to respect the obligation not to 
return individuals, either formally recognized refugees or non-recognized refugees, 
to territories where their lives may be in danger. Hence, all three countries have to 
observe the principle of non-refoulement both at their borders and within their ter-
ritories (UNHCR 1977).
Over the past decades, human rights law scholars have developed the idea that 
there should be no exceptions to the prohibition of refoulement. That trend, which 
treated the right of non-refoulement as a non-derogable right, embraced the stance 
that people should never be, under any circumstances, deported to a territory where 
they may face the risk of persecution (Lauterpacht, Bethlehem 2001: 131–132; UNHCR 
1980; UNHCR, OAU 1980). UNHCR, for example, supported the position that even in 
cases of large-scale influx “the fundamental principle of non-refoulement – including 
non-rejection at the frontier – must be scrupulously observed” (UNHCR 1981). There 
is, however, still a strong recognition among states that in some circumstances it is 
possible to lawfully expel refugees and asylum seekers to territories where their lives 
and freedoms would be in danger. That position primarily relies on the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention, which states in Article 33(2) that it is permissible to lawfully expel 
individuals who represent a danger to the national security of the host country, and 
individuals who are recognized, after being convicted of a serious crime by a court of 
law, as a danger to the community of the host country (UN General Assembly 1951). 
The application of exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement is therefore 
permissible but must be subjected to two limitations. Firstly, exceptions to non-re-
foulement are permissible only when individuals pose a real threat to national secu-
rity or a danger to the community of the country of refuge. Threats to national se-
curity may include espionage, attacks on military installations and terrorist activities 
in the host country (Grahl Madsen 1997: 235–236), while dangers to the community 
may include serious crimes such as murder, rape, or arson (Lauterpacht, Bethlehem 
2001: 139). Secondly, exceptions can be applied only in compliance with due process 
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of law. When, for example, host countries want to return individuals due to concerns 
about public safety, they are allowed to do so only if those individuals had been 
convicted of a serious criminal offence by a court of law operating in compliance 
with minimum international standards (ibid.: 138–140). All such cases of refoulement 
require individual assessment and must be supported by evidence (ibid.). 
This section aims at examining whether Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon applied these 
exceptions, and respected the limitations that restrict the scope of the exceptions, 
when they carried out mass rejections of Syrian asylum seekers. The examination will 
focus on three practices used by Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon to carry out rejections 
of Syrians in order to determine whether the three countries observed the limitations 
restricting the exceptions to non-refoulement. The three practices are as follows.
Border Closures and Push-Backs
The first practice, which targeted Syrian asylum seekers who did not yet enter the 
three host countries, was to sporadically close borders, especially during escalations 
of violence in Syria, and carry out “push-backs” of people trying to flee Syria.2
In Turkey, security forces have sporadically used border closures and push-backs 
against Syrians since at least 2012 (Dinçer et al. 2013: 5; Koca 2015: 216–217; HRW 
2013b). When carrying out push-backs, Turkish border guards resorted to unlawful 
use of force that included shooting at and beating Syrians trying to cross the border. 
In a few cases, the use of abusive force resulted in Syrians being killed or injured 
(AI 2014a: 9–10; HRW 2015; Rifai 2015; HRW 2016a). In addition, the Turkish author-
ities regularly closed official border crossings, particularly in the south-east of the 
country where they wanted to prevent access for Syrians fleeing from areas with 
a predominantly Kurdish population (AI 2014: 9–10). When the fighting across Syr-
ia intensified and the number of Syrian asylum seekers continued to increase, the 
Turkish authorities opted to close the entire border. From early 2015 to mid-2016, the 
Turkish-Syrian border remained virtually closed, which led to an estimated 165,000 
Syrian asylum seekers being stranded on the Syrian side of the border (DRC 2016: 4). 
A similar tactic was adopted by Jordan. From mid-2014 to mid-2016, the Jorda-
nian authorities closed the border to temporarily prevent the entry of about 70,000 
Syrian asylum seekers. The Jordanian security forces trapped the Syrians in a desert 
area just a few hundred metres south of the Jordanian-Syrian border (HRW 2016b). 
In Lebanon, they permanently closed the border to almost all Syrian asylum 
seekers in early 2015. In that period of time, the Lebanese government introduced 
new regulations that allowed the entry into Lebanon only of Syrians with valid trav-
el documents who fit into one of the seven approved entry categories (e.g. tourism 
2 According to the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR 2018), push-
backs are state measures that aim at forcing refugees and migrants back over a border – usually 
immediately after they cross it – without providing them the opportunity to apply for asylum.
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and business, education, transiting to a third country, medical treatment, displace-
ment in the country of origin, etc.) (Janmyr 2016: 66–67). After the introduction of 
the new entry regime, the Lebanese government announced strict rules for de-
termining which groups of displaced Syrians would be admitted into the country. 
According to the new rules, only the following groups of displaced Syrians were 
allowed to enter Lebanon: unaccompanied and/or separated Syrian children with 
a parent already registered as a refugee in Lebanon; Syrians with disabilities and a 
relative already registered in Lebanon; Syrians with urgent medical needs for whom 
treatment in Syria was unavailable, and Syrians who had already arranged a reset-
tlement to a third country (ICL 2015). By implementing these entry requirements, I 
contend, the Lebanese government effectively closed the border to the vast major-
ity of Syrian asylum seekers.
By relying on practices that physically prevented asylum seekers from crossing 
the borders and reaching the authorities responsible for status determination proce-
dures, all three host countries systemically violated the principle of non-refoulement. 
Mass rejections of potential asylum seekers at the frontiers are a clear violation of 
the norm prohibiting refoulement (Lauterpacht, Bethlehem 2001: 118–119). Even if 
we take into account the exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement, we see that 
none of the three countries was able to justify the mass rejections by presenting 
them as lawful exceptions. First, none of the host countries provided compelling evi-
dence indicating that the returns were carried out because those who were rejected 
represented a real threat to the national security and/or public safety of the host 
countries. Second, none of the host countries examined the facts of each individual 
case of those who were rejected. The host countries were unable to claim that the 
rejected individuals represented a threat to public safety because they did not check 
at the border crossings whether those individuals had been convicted of any crime 
by a court of law operating in compliance with minimum international standards. 
Discriminatory Criteria
The second practice targeted Syrians, and non-Syrians living in Syria, who had not 
yet managed to enter the host countries. This practice relied on the use of selec-
tive criteria for determining which groups of asylum seekers were not allowed to 
cross from Syria into the host countries. In parallel with sporadic border closures and 
push-backs, the governments of all three host countries implemented discriminato-
ry policies that prevented specific categories of Syrians and non-Syrians from seek-
ing protected status. 
The first category consisted of people of specific national origins – i.e. Palestini-
an refugees and Iraqi refugees living in Syria. In Jordan, for example, the authorities 
started to deny entry to all Palestinians from Syria in April 2012 (ARDD 2015; UNHCR 
2017b: 2). Jordanian government officials justified their decision by claiming that a 
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large number of Palestinians in Jordan would alter the demographic balance of the 
country and, consequently, create a security threat (HRW 2014: 12–13; AI 2013: 10). 
In addition, the Jordanian authorities also denied entry to Iraqi refugees who had 
previously found shelter in Syria. That decision was justified with the argument that 
Iraqis had to return to their country of origin, which was deemed safe by the Jorda-
nian government (AI 2013: 10). 
In Lebanon, the local authorities closed the border to the vast majority of Pales-
tinians from Syria. Although Lebanese officials insisted that the open door policy for 
Syrian refugees, including Palestinians, remained in place, the strict entry require-
ments gradually introduced for Palestinians made it almost impossible for most of 
them to enter Lebanon (UNHCR 2016: 12–13).
In mid-2013, the Lebanese authorities made the first changes in the entry re-
quirements for Palestinians from Syria. Entry into Lebanon was allowed only to Pal-
estinians who had one of the following: a visa that had to be obtained through an 
application made by a guarantor in Lebanon; a visa and a ticket to a third country 
in order to prove they were only transiting through Lebanon; evidence indicating 
they had a scheduled medical or embassy appointment in Lebanon; or evidence 
indicating they had family members already legally residing in Lebanon (AI 2014b: 
11). In mid-2014, the Lebanese authorities introduced new changes in the regulations 
to further restrict the entry of Palestinians from Syria. The new rules stipulated that 
Palestinian asylum seekers would be admitted into Lebanon only if they met one of 
the following requirements: an entry permit approved by the General Directorate 
of General Security, the Lebanese intelligence agency; a one-year or three-year res-
idence permit; an exit and return permit; or a ticket and visa to a third country (AI 
2014b: 14; UNHCR 2017b, 1–2). By creating such strict requirements for the entry of 
Palestinians, the Lebanese authorities virtually closed the border to the vast majority 
of Palestinians seeking asylum.
The second category of Syrians who were not allowed to enter Jordan consisted 
of Syrian asylum seekers of a specific gender and marital status. In 2013, the Jordani-
an authorities decided to close the border to single men from Syria (HRW 2013a). Al-
though Jordanian officials did not explain the reason behind their decision, it seems 
they believed that single military-aged men represented a potential security threat 
for the country.
The third category consisted of Syrians who lacked proper travel documenta-
tion. During the Syrian conflict, all three host countries decided that Syrians with-
out valid documentation would not be allowed to cross the borders. In 2013, for ex-
ample, the Jordanian security forces routinely prevented undocumented Syrians, 
most of them asylum seekers, from entering Jordan (HRW 2013a). In 2014, the Turk-
ish authorities started denying entry to Syrians without passports at official border 
crossings. The temporary measure impacted a large number of Syrians seeking 
protection, as most of them did not have valid travel documents (AI 2014a: 9). At 
the beginning of 2015, the Turkish government made that measure permanent by 
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announcing new regulations that required all Syrian asylum seekers entering Turkey 
to present a valid travel document (HRW 2015). Lebanon made a similar decision 
at that time. In early 2015, when the Lebanese government introduced a new visa 
regime for Syrians, only Syrian citizens with valid travel documents and visas were 
allowed to enter Lebanon (Janmyr 2016: 66–67).
The fourth category, a category of Syrians who were prohibited from entering 
Lebanon in 2014, consisted of Syrian asylum seekers fleeing from specific locations 
within their war-torn country. On the one hand, the Lebanese authorities claimed 
that some areas within Syria remained safe, and, consequently, prohibited individu-
als fleeing from those areas from entering Lebanon (HRF 2014). On the other hand, 
the Lebanese authorities also decided to allow only Syrian asylum seekers living in 
areas near the Syrian-Lebanese border to enter Lebanon, and, as a result, prevented 
the entry of individuals who fled from Syrian villages and cities located far from the 
Syrian-Lebanese border (ibid.).
The result of all of the abovementioned entry requirements is that many Syrians, 
and non-Syrians living in Syria, were not able to reach safe places and seek protection 
in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. By introducing discriminatory restrictions based on 
nationality, gender, marital status, possession of travel documents and geographical 
location, the authorities in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon again breached the princi-
ple of non-refoulement. The three host countries were again unable to justify the 
mass rejections at the borders by presenting them as lawful exceptions to the norm 
prohibiting refoulement. First, all three countries failed to provide evidence indicat-
ing that the returns were necessary in order to protect the national security and/
or public safety of the host countries. The Jordanian authorities merely speculated 
that large numbers of Palestinian refugees may pose a threat to national security 
in the future. The rejections of Palestinians were therefore unlawful because they 
were grounded on the assumption that a threat may materialize in the future and 
not on actual criminal acts committed by Palestinian refugees (e.g. terrorist attacks, 
espionage, etc.). Second, the three host countries failed to provide individual assess-
ments of those who were returned. The rejections targeted specific groups of Syrian 
asylum seekers without examining the facts of each individual case. 
Detentions and Deportations
The third practice, used sporadically by Turkey and Jordan, was to detain and deport 
Syrian asylum seekers and refugees who were already in the countries. 
In Turkey, in September 2015 the local security forces started detaining and de-
porting registered Syrian refugees and asylum seekers who attempted to cross ir-
regularly to Greece (AI 2015: 1). The detentions were arbitrary: the Turkish authorities 
did not inform the detainees why they were being deprived of their liberty, although 
they later claimed, without providing references to the law, that the detainees may 
Rejected Syrians: Violations of the Principle of “Non-Refoulement” in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon
94
D V E  D O M O V I N I  •  T W O  H O M E L A N D S  •  4 9  •  2 0 1 9
be held in detention on grounds of security or because they were involved in crim-
inal acts (AI 2015: 3–6). While holding refugees in detention, usually for a period of 
up to two months, the security forces refused to allow them to contact their family 
members and lawyers (ibid.). In early 2016, after sealing the border with Syria, the 
Turkish security forces were detaining and deporting Syrian refugees found with-
out their registration documents and asylum seekers who were attempting to reg-
ister in the border province of Hatay (AI 2016). The detentions were arbitrary: the 
Turkish authorities did not inform the detainees, at the time of their arrests, of the 
reasons for the arrests and of any charges against them, and they did not bring the 
detainees before a judge or any other official authorized to exercise judicial power 
in accordance with procedures established by law (ibid.). In that period, the Turkish 
authorities carried out operations on a nearly daily basis in which they arrested and 
deported groups of up to 100 Syrian citizens seeking protection (ibid.). In 2018, Tur-
key detained and deported Syrians who tried to flee Idlib province in north-western 
Syria (Carrié, Al Omar 2018). 
In Jordan, the security forces carried out detentions and deportations of asylum 
seekers who were prohibited from entering Jordan – i.e. Palestinian refugees from 
Syria. After the Jordanian government stopped allowing Palestinians from Syria to 
cross into Jordan, the Jordanian police and intelligence agency started detaining 
and deporting Palestinians who entered the country irregularly (HRW 2014: 18–22). It 
was unclear whether the security forces carried out the detentions and deportations 
arbitrarily or on the basis of a law criminalizing irregular migration. As a result of the 
non-admission policy, all Palestinian asylum seekers, including women and children, 
who entered Jordan irregularly were deemed to have committed an immigration 
crime and were, consequently, subjected to penalties provided by the law. Article 31 
of the Law on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs (1973) stipulates that any person who 
enters Jordan without valid travel documents and visas through unofficial border 
crossings shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of between one and six months, 
or to a fine of between 10 and 50 Jordanian Dinars, or both. In addition to fines and/
or imprisonment, the law also provides for the expulsion of foreigners who enter 
the country irregularly (GDP 2015: 7–10). The Palestinian asylum seekers arrested by 
the Jordanian security forces were usually held in detention for several days before 
being deported to areas in Syria under the control of Syrian anti-government forces 
(HRW 2014: 18–22; Akram et al. 2014: 64).
Like the first two practices examined above, the detentions and deportations 
carried out in Turkey and Jordan constituted a violation of the principle of non-re-
foulement. Both countries carried out the expulsions of refugees and asylum seek-
ers without justifying them as exceptions to the norm prohibiting non-refoulement. 
First, neither Turkey nor Jordan provided compelling evidence to prove that those 
who were deported to their country of origin represented a threat to the national 
security and/or public safety of the host countries. Second, Turkey, which resorted 
to arbitrary detentions of asylum seekers and registered refugees, did not carry out 
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the detentions and deportations in compliance with due process of law. The Turkish 
authorities did not prove that the rejected individuals represented a threat to public 
safety because none of the individuals concerned was convicted of any crime by a 
court of law. 
CREATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE “REFOULEMENT”
The definition of the principle of non-refoulement broadly states that host countries 
shall not return refugees in any manner whatsoever to territories where their lives 
could be threatened (UN General Assembly 1951). Drawing on the broad wording 
employed to prohibit any act of removal, many authors argued that the concept 
of refoulement includes constructive refoulement, a form of refoulement that occurs 
when host countries deliberately deny refugees and asylum seekers their econom-
ic, social and cultural rights in order to leave them with no choice but to return to 
their unsafe country of origin (Edwards 2005: 322–323; Bhattacharjee 2013: 48–49; 
Ramsden, Marsh 2014: 275; Hathaway 2005: 464; Nessel 2015: 339–340). Constructive 
refoulement is, therefore, a form of refoulement that is not committed directly (e.g. 
through border closures and push-backs) but indirectly (e.g. through policies and 
practices that compromise the legal, material, and physical safety of asylum seekers 
and refugees) (Schneebaum 2010: 8–9). Some of the practices used by host countries 
to put pressure on asylum seekers and refugees in order to indirectly force them 
to return to their country of origin are as follows: denying asylum seekers access 
to fair and effective protection status determination procedures; limiting or com-
pletely denying refugees access to the formal labour market or opportunities for 
self-employment; denying asylum seekers and refugees access to basic services; and 
subjecting asylum seekers and refugees to human rights abuses (Kneebone 2006: 
698–699; Bhattacharjee 2013: 48–49; Schneebaum 2010: 8–9).
While examining the practices used by Lebanon to create circumstances for con-
structive refoulement, we could focus on an array of measures that undermined the 
physical, material and legal safety of Syrians who found refuge within the country. 
This article, however, primarily focuses on the legal safety, or the lack thereof, of Syr-
ian asylum seekers and refugees. The objective is to examine how various practices 
employed by the Lebanese authorities left many Syrians without legal status and 
thus put them under pressure to repatriate. The five practices that Lebanon used to 
create circumstances for constructive refoulement can be divided in two categories: 
first, practices that targeted Syrian asylum seekers to deny them access to protection 
status determination procedures in order to prevent them from exercising their right 
to seek asylum, and, second, practices that stripped Syrian refugees of protected 
status and prevented them from obtaining/retaining residence permits that would 
allow them to legally reside in the host country.
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Denial of Access to Protection Status Determination Procedures
The failure to provide fair and effective status determination procedures may result 
in constructive refoulement (Legomsky 2003: 73; Kneebone 2006: 698–699). If host 
countries fail to establish protection status determination procedures, they leave 
asylum seekers without a legal status and, consequently, without any rights and 
benefits (e.g. access to health services, employment, education etc.). When asylum 
seekers find themselves in such a precarious position, they may be indirectly forced 
to return to their country of origin.
The Lebanese authorities failed to provide fair and effective protection status 
determination procedures for Syrian asylum seekers by either limiting or completely 
preventing access to such procedures. First, following its decision to seal the border 
to the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers, in May 2015 the Lebanese government 
ordered the UNHCR, the sole authority responsible for making protection status de-
terminations in Lebanon, to suspend procedures for the registration of Syrians who 
were already in Lebanon and those who would arrive in the future (Janmyr 2016: 
63–64). After the closure of the Lebanese-Syrian border, the vast majority of new 
asylum seekers from Syria were treated by the Lebanese authorities as irregular mi-
grants who had no access to asylum. Although the Lebanese authorities justified 
their decision to prevent the UNHCR from registering new arrivals by promising that 
new status determination procedures would soon be established, no new proce-
dures had been put in place by early 2017 (Janmyr 2016: 64; HRW 2017).
Second, even when Lebanon allowed UNHCR to process asylum claims, many 
Syrians remained without access to the UNHCR registration centres and thus unable 
to lodge asylum claims. The Lebanese security forces limited access to registration 
centres by regularly harassing and intimidating Syrian asylum seekers, in particular 
young men who entered the country irregularly (IRC 2016; HRW 2016c: 15–18). Many 
unregistered Syrian single men who were detained and subjected to ill-treatment 
while in detention decided to restrict their movements in order to avoid being de-
tained again (IRC 2016). The constant experience of threat to their personal safety 
that came mainly from the Lebanese security forces and to a lesser extent from the 
local population forced many unregistered Syrian men to limit their movements to 
areas they knew (i.e. refugee camps or urban areas with a predominantly Syrian ref-
ugee population) (ibid.). Such “self-imposed” restrictions on the freedom of move-
ment prevented many Syrian men from reaching UNHCR registration centres and 
seek protection (LHIF 2014: 11; IRC 2016).3
3 It was not possible to determine exactly how many Syrian men were unable to reach the 
UNHCR due to restrictions on the freedom of movement. The IRC (2016), which conducted 
interviews with 468 Syrian men in 2015, reported that 19 percent of them said they were un-
able to access UNHCR registration centres due to restrictions on the freedom of movement.
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Denying Refugees Protected Status and Residency Permits
The second category of practices that created conditions for constructive refoule-
ment targeted registered Syrian refugees in order to deny them the right to enjoy 
asylum. These practices pursued two objectives: first, to strip Syrian refugees of their 
protected status, and, second, to prevent refugees from obtaining/retaining resi-
dence permits.
First, the Lebanese authorities introduced measures to strip Syrian refugees of 
their protected status. One of the measures was to de-register Syrian refugees who 
briefly returned to their country of origin (HRF 2014). Many Syrian refugees who 
found shelter in Lebanon temporarily returned to Syria in order to carry out activi-
ties they considered important (e.g. to help their family members flee from Syria, to 
sell the land they owned in Syria, to collect their salaries, etc.) (ibid.). Despite having 
legitimate reasons for briefly returning to their unsafe home country, those Syrians 
were stripped of their protected status and not allowed to re-enter Lebanon (ibid.).4 
Another measure was to de-register Syrian refugees who entered Lebanon after the 
introduction of the border closure in early January 2015. In April 2015, the Lebanese 
government ordered UNHCR to de-register more than 1,400 Syrian refugees who 
had arrived in Lebanon, and had received protected status, after 5 January 2015 (ICL 
2015). The Lebanese authorities refused to admit new refugees following the intro-
duction of the border closure, and, therefore, they demanded that UNHCR remove 
the protected status of Syrians who had been granted limited protected status after 
the introduction of the border closure (ibid.).
Second, the Lebanese authorities introduced measures to prevent large num-
bers of registered Syrian refugees from obtaining/retaining residence permits. One 
measure, which was partially abandoned in early 2017, was to introduce fees that Syr-
ian refugees registered with UNHCR had to pay in order to obtain the legal right to 
stay in Lebanon. The Lebanese government created a system in which registration 
with UNHCR did not automatically provide Syrian refugees with a right to stay in the 
country. If registered Syrian refugees wanted to legally reside in Lebanon, they had 
to apply for residence permits that were issued by the Lebanese authorities (LHIF 
2014: 9). In addition to the right to stay in Lebanon, residence permits also granted 
4 Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention stipulates that the term refugee shall apply to a 
person that is outside the country of his nationality. Therefore, the refugee status of an individual 
can be terminated upon his re-establishment in his country of nationality because he no longer 
meets the criterion in Article 1A(2) (Grahl Madsen 1966: 370–371; Fitzpatrick, Bonoan 2003: 528). 
The Refugee Convention also states – in Article 1C(4) – that the Convention shall cease to apply to 
any person who “voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which 
he remained owing to fear of persecution.” However, automatic termination of protected status 
as a punishment for any return to the country of origin is inappropriate (Fitzpatrick, Bonoan 2003: 
528–529). The revoking of protected status is inappropriate when a refugee makes only a brief 
visit to his country of origin (e.g. visit for family, political, or economic reasons) and his primary 
residence remains in the country of asylum (ibid.). This paper argues that the brief returns by 
Syrians to their country of origin were not a valid reason for terminating their protected status.
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other important rights and benefits such as access to healthcare at government fa-
cilities, the right to register births and marriages, and the right for students to take 
official exams at Lebanese schools (AI 2014b: 15). 
The process for granting residence permits distinguished between Syrians who 
entered Lebanon through official border crossings and those who entered irregularly 
through unofficial border points (LHIF 2014: 9–10). Syrian refugees who entered Leba-
non through official border crossings were initially granted, free of charge, residence 
permits for a period of six months. When the permits expired, Syrians could renew 
them, free of charge, for a new six-month period. After one year, all adult Syrian ref-
ugees (aged 15 years and above) again had to renew their residence permits, but at a 
cost of US $200 per person/per year (NRC, IRC 2015: 13; LHIF 2014: 9). This fee proved 
to be an insurmountable obstacle for many destitute Syrian refugees. Many Syrians 
whose permits expired during their stay in Lebanon cited the prohibitive cost of renew-
al as the main reason that prevented them from renewing the permits (NRC 2014: 13; 
NRC, IRC 2015: 21). It was even worse for Syrian refugees who entered Lebanon through 
unofficial border crossings. Even if they somehow managed to register with UNHCR, it 
was very expensive for them to obtain residence permits from the Lebanese authori-
ties. In order to legitimize their stay in Lebanon, they were expected to pay a fine for 
entering the country irregularly and fees for the period of time they lived illegitimately 
in Lebanon (LHIF 2014: 9). In some cases, the total cost for legitimizing a stay exceeded 
US $600 per person (ibid.). As a result, many Syrian families who could not afford to pay 
such a large sum had no choice but to live illegitimately without residence permits.5
Another measure, which targeted Palestinian refugees from Syria, was to stop 
granting and renewing residence permits. After introducing the non-admission pol-
icy for Palestinian refugees from Syria, the Lebanese authorities started to refuse to 
renew residence permits for some of the Palestinian refugees who were already in 
Lebanon (AI 2014b: 15). In May 2014, for example, the Lebanese authorities called 
on Palestinian refugees from Syria to settle their status by applying for residence 
permits (ibid.). Some Palestinian refugees who went to the General Security office to 
legitimize their status were denied residence permits and given deportation orders 
with time periods ranging from 24 hours to one week (ibid.).
By demanding fees and fines from Syrian refugees, and by deciding to stop 
granting residence permits for Palestinian refugees from Syria, the Lebanese author-
ities ensured that many registered refugees remained without a residence permit, 
and, as a result, without the right to legally reside in Lebanon. By re-categorizing 
many Syrian refugees as irregular migrants (Oxfam 2015: 17), the Lebanese authori-
ties undermined the legal safety of those refugees.
5 In 2015, the NRC and IRC (2015: 17–21) conducted interviews with 395 Syrian refugees in Leb-
anon. Out of the 395 refugees, 343 had a residence permit that expired during their stay in 
Lebanon. About half – 54 percent – of those 343 refugees said they were not able to renew 
their residence permits for a variety of reasons. The majority – 68 percent – of those unable 
to renew their residence permits said that the main reason was the cost of renewal.
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CONCLUSION
The right to seek and enjoy asylum is a fundamental human right originally en-
shrined in the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and reaffirmed in numerous 
UN General Assembly Resolutions (UN General Assembly 1948; IMBR 2013). Although 
Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon opened their borders to millions of Syrian asylum seek-
ers, the various anti-refugee practices introduced by all three countries indicate that 
many Syrians were prevented from exercising their right to seek and enjoy asylum. 
The first three practices examined above aimed at denying the right to seek and 
enjoy asylum by physically preventing Syrians from lodging asylum claims at UNHCR 
or any other authority responsible for protection status determination. The govern-
ments of all three host countries resorted to border closures and rejections of spe-
cific groups of Syrians in order to prevent new Syrian asylum seekers from crossing 
the borders and reaching the authorities responsible for protection status determi-
nation. In addition, two of the host countries – Turkey and Jordan – used arbitrary 
detentions and deportations to target Syrians who were already in their territories in 
order to prevent them from seeking and enjoying asylum. 
The other practices used by Lebanon aimed at stripping registered Syrian refu-
gees of their legal status in order to prevent them from enjoying asylum and thus to 
indirectly force them to return home. By shutting down the sole authority respon-
sible for status determination procedures, by de-registering some Syrian refugees, 
and by not allowing Syrian refugees to obtain/retain residence permits, Lebanon 
compromised the legal safety of Syrians, stripped them of their rights and benefits, 
and thus put pressure on them to return to their unsafe country of origin. The pres-
sure primarily emanated from the fact that Syrians who were not allowed to obtain/
retain protected status and residence permits were de facto re-categorized as irreg-
ular migrants, and, therefore, put at risk of being detained and deported. On the ba-
sis of a law criminalizing irregular migration in Lebanon, Syrians without protected 
status and residence permits were continually in danger of being imprisoned and 
deported. Article 323 of the Law Regulating the Entry and Exit of Foreigners in Lebanon 
and their Exit from the Country (1962) provides criminal charges and penalties – i.e. 
imprisonment of one to three months, payment of a fine, and expulsion from Leba-
non – for individuals, including asylum seekers, convicted of entering and staying in 
Lebanon without valid travel documentation and visas. 
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POVZETEK
ZAVRNJENI SIRCI: KRŠITVE NAČELA NEVRAČANJA V TURČIJI, LIBANONU 
IN JORDANIJI
Vasja BADALIČ
Pravica iskati in uživati pribežališče pred preganjanjem je temeljna človekova pra-
vica. Čeprav so Turčija, Jordanija in Libanon skupno sprejeli približno pet milijonov 
sirskih beguncev, številni protibegunski ukrepi, ki so jih uvedle vse tri države, naka-
zujejo, da mnogi sirski državljani niso imeli možnosti uveljaviti pravice do iskanja in 
uživanja pribežališča pred preganjanjem. Protibegunske ukrepe, ki so jih uporabile 
države gostiteljice, lahko razdelimo v dve kategoriji.
Prva kategorija je vsebovala nezakonite ukrepe, s katerimi so vse tri države go-
stiteljice kršile načelo nevračanja. Ti ukrepi so merili predvsem na to, da sirskim dr-
žavljanom preprečijo prečkanje meje in vložitev prošnje za azil. Prvi ukrep, ki so ga 
uporabile vse tri države gostiteljice, je bila zapora meje in preprečevanje prehoda 
sirskim državljanom, ki so bežali pred vojno. Drugi ukrep je bil uporaba selektivnih 
kriterijev za določanje skupin Sircev, ki jim ni bil dovoljen prehod meje (npr. pale-
stinski in iraški begunci, ki so živeli v Siriji; mladi, neporočeni moški; sirski državljani 
brez veljavnih dokumentov; sirski državljani, ki so prihajali z območij, oddaljenih od 
libanonsko-sirske meje, ali z območij, za katere so libanonske oblasti trdile, da so 
varne). Tretji ukrep, ki sta ga uporabili Turčija in Jordanija, je bil samovoljno zapiranje 
in deportiranje sirskih iskalcev azila in beguncev.
Druga kategorija protibegunskih ukrepov je vsebovala ukrepe, s katerimi je ena 
med državami gostiteljicami – Libanon – ustvarila pogoje za posredno prisilno vra-
čanje tako sirskih iskalcev azila kot tudi že registriranih sirskih beguncev, ki so že bili 
v Libanonu. Prvi ukrep je bil zaprtje pisarne UNHCR v Libanonu, edine institucije, ki 
je bila pristojna za obravnavanje prošenj za azil. Drugi ukrep je bil odvzem statusa 
nekaterim sirskim beguncem (npr. beguncem, ki so se začasno vrnili v Sirijo; begun-
cem, ki so bili registrirani po zaprtju meje na začetku leta 2015). Tretji ukrep je meril 
na to, da sirskim beguncem prepreči pridobitev dovoljenja za bivanje (npr. z uvedbo 
visokih pristojbin, ki jih begunci niso mogli plačati; s prenehanjem izdajanja dovo-
ljenj za bivanje palestinskim beguncem).
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